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Are Juries Less Erratic than Individuals?
Deliberation, Polarization, and
Punitive Damages
David Schkade,* Cass R. Sunstein,** and Daniel Kahneman***
I. Introduction
How does group deliberation affect individual judgments? How
does the outcome of jury deliberations differ from some aggregation
of individual decisions pre-deliberation? Speculation is not difficult.
Perhaps juries converge toward the mean of individual judgments;
perhaps juries move away from, or toward, the high or low of
individual extremes. Perhaps juries approach an outcome that is more
just or more accurate; perhaps juries produce more predictable and
less erratic judgments, so that unpredictability at the individual level,
or at the level of the mean or median of (six or twelve) individual
judgments, does not exist at the jury level. A pervasive question is
whether a deliberating jury has the effect of producing outcomes
that treat the similarly situated similarly—perhaps in terms of civil or
criminal liability (do people who have engaged in the same conduct
receive the same verdict?), perhaps in the determination of
appropriate damage awards, either compensatory or punitive (do
similarly situated people receive the same awards?).1
We attempt to make some progress on these questions. We do
so principally by reporting the results of an extensive study of mock
*

Professor of Management and William R. Spriegel Fellow, Graduate School
of Business, University of Texas, Austin.
**
Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law
School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago.
***
Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology and Professor of Public Affairs,
Princeton University. The authors are grateful to Exxon Company, U.S.A. for
support of the research in this Article. Exxon bears no responsibility for our
analysis or our conclusions; the data reported and the opinions expressed here
belong to the authors. For helpful comments we are grateful to Robert
MacCoun, Eric Posner, and Richard Posner.
1
For concerns along this line, see BMW of North America v. Gore, 116 S Ct
1589 (1996); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of
Punitive Damages, 72 Va L Rev 139 (1986).
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juries (over 500 juries in total). In the study, these juries were asked
to deliberate about punitive damage awards; individual judgments
were collected before the jury deliberated. To compress a long story,
our principal finding is that deliberation increased both
unpredictability and variance, by making large awards much larger
and small awards smaller still. Thus the principal effect of
deliberation is often to polarize individual judgments, a pattern that
has been found in many other group decision making contexts.2
This finding—the first of its kind in the particular context of
punitive damage awards—has important implications for jury awards
involving both punitive and compensatory damages. It bears on
group deliberation in other contexts as well. The same phenomenon
of polarization that occurs in our punitive damage juries can be used
to explain why a group of people moderately predisposed in favor of
gun control will, after discussion, tend to be more than moderately
predisposed in that direction, and why a group of individuals
cautiously opposed to affirmative action is likely, after discussion, to
oppose affirmative action with considerable fervor.
The study reported here has the advantage of being extremely
close to—in fact part of the design is based on—an earlier one
involving not deliberating juries but responses of 899 individuals to
punitive damage cases.3 Our earlier study showed a remarkable
consensus in individual judgments, made along a bounded numerical
scale, about a series of personal injury cases. That study therefore
found that with respect to the underlying moral evaluation, different
(synthetic, non-deliberating4) juries are likely to reach similar
2

See, e.g., David Myers and Helmut Lamm, The Group Polarization
Phenomenon, 83 Psych. Bulletin 602 (1976); Daniel Isenberg, Group
Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. Personality and
Social Psychology 1141 (1986).
3
See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade, Assessing
Punitive Damages, 107 Yale LJ 2071 (1998). This presentation is geared to
analysis of the legal issues; the underlying data, and relevant psychological
points, are presented in more detail in Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and
Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of
Punitive Damages, 16 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 49 (1998).
4
As explained below, synthetic juries consisted of random groups of twelve
individual judgments, with the mean or median judgment of the group of
twelve reflecting the “verdict.” See 107 Yale LJ at 2098.
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conclusions about the relative severity of different cases.5 Thus allwhite, all-poor, all-rich, all-educated, all poorly educated, all-male,
all-female, all-young, and all-old juries would probably come to very
similar rankings of a set of cases, at least in personal injury cases and
very possibly elsewhere.6 It follows that averaging the judgments of
any random group of twelve people is likely to produce a moral
judgment that predicts, with a reasonably high degree of accuracy,
the judgment of any other group of twelve people. At the same time,
the study found that when asked to assess cases in terms of dollars,
(synthetic, non-deliberating) juries become extremely unpredictable.7
They become unpredictable in the specific sense that the judgment
of any particular group of twelve is a poor predictor of the judgment
of other groups of twelve.8 We speculated that it is the dollar scale
that accounts for evidently erratic monetary judgments in many areas
of the law, including not only punitive damages but compensatory
awards in areas involving libel, sexual harassment, pain and
suffering,9 and intentional infliction of emotional distress.10 When
juries use the dollar scale, their verdicts probably do not treat the
similarly situated similarly, with some awards that are arbitrarily high
and others that are arbitrarily low. This unpredictability is also likely
to produce overdeterrence in risk-averse defendants or in any case
muffled and confusing (and to that extent costly) signals.11
A natural question is, however, raised by these conclusions. This
question is one of concern to those interested in damages, juries, and
5

Id. at 2095-2100.
Id. at 2097-2100.
7
Id. at 2100-2104.
8
Note that in our study we hold constant several factors that can be used to
capture some of the variability in punitive damage awards, such as
compensatory damages, case category, case particulars, and jurisdiction. It has
been proposed by some authors that when analyzed using these factors,
punitive awards are reasonably predictable. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., The
Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. Legal Stud. 623 (1997), Because we
hold these factors constant, the unpredictability that we documented previously,
and that we document here, cannot be accounted for by any of these factors.
9
See, e.g., David Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering
Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 256 (1989).
10
Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, supra, at 2131-2140.
11
See Paul Rubin et al., BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of
Punitive Damages, 1997 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 179, 184.
6
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deliberative processes in general12: whether a deliberating jury might
reduce or even eliminate the unpredictability of dollar awards. How
does the process of jury deliberation affect the remarkable moral
consensus? Will different juries converge toward the same dollar
amount? The answers should have implications not only for punitive
awards, but also for other damage judgments, certainly when these
are hard to monetize, and possibly for questions of civil and criminal
liability as well and even for deliberation generally. An additional
question, also important, is what happens to dollar awards when
juries deliberate: As compared with individual conclusions predeliberation, do such awards tend to go up, go down, or remain the
same?
On the basis of a study of 3048 jury-eligible citizens in Phoenix,
Arizona, participating in 509 mock juries, we offer two principal
conclusions here, which we now state in somewhat less compressed
form. The first is that juries do not produce less erratic and more
predictable awards than individuals. On the contrary, deliberating
juries tend to generate, with respect to dollar awards, even greater
variance and unpredictability than is present in the judgments of the
jurors who compose them. This is no mere technical conclusion; it
suggests that the problem of erratic awards is intensified, not
reduced, by deliberating juries.
The second conclusion, a corollary of the first, is that
deliberating juries significantly, and systematically, increase large
punitive damage awards and also decrease small punitive damage
awards. In our study, jury judgments were more lenient than
individual juror judgments for cases of less serious misconduct by the
defendant; for cases of moderately serious and very serious
misconduct, however, jury judgments were harsher, in many cases
dramatically so. In 21% of the cases, the jury verdict was as high as or
higher than that of the highest individual judgment predeliberation. As we discuss below, this result is part of the general
phenomenon of group polarization, in accordance with which a
deliberating group tends to shift toward a more extreme version of
12

On the latter topic, see Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy
and Disagreement (1997); our analysis of group polarization raises some
questions for the deliberative conception of democracy, though we leave those
questions largely implicit here.
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the views its members brought with them. The phenomenon of
group polarization—with discussion amplifying initial individual
tendencies, whatever they may be13—operates in accordance with
identifiable mechanisms (thus far unexamined within the legal
culture), which, unfortunately, do not suggest that the shifts are
necessarily desirable, or that they implement any legitimate concerns
of the legal system.
What follows at the normative level? The safest and most
cautious conclusion is that to the extent that unpredictable punitive
damage awards raise a serious concern, the problem is magnified
rather than diminished by the process of deliberation. But is the
increase in awards a tribute to the benefits of collective discussion?
Without an independent theory of what awards should be, the
evidence found here does not rule out that hopeful conclusion. But it
certainly provides no affirmative support for it, or for the suggestion
that group deliberation will, in this context, increase the rationality
and soundness of outcomes. On the contrary, the substantial
increases of high awards and the (smaller) decreases in low awards
are predictable consequences of the effects of deliberation on a scale
having a lower bound but lacking an upper bound.
In these circumstances, there are two implications for reform.
The first involves the possibility, now shown to be feasible, of asking
jurors to generate not a dollar figure, but a normative judgment on a
bounded numerical scale. As we will explain, the deliberating juries
in this study were able to use a punishment scale quite effectively;
such a scale might be used as the foundation of dollar awards, in a
way that could dramatically decrease unpredictability. The second
implication follows from the fact that deliberation increases high
awards and decreases low ones, in a way that increases variance and
unpredictability. To the extent that unpredictability is a problem, our
findings provide additional support for the view that punitive awards
should be made not by juries, but by judges or some kind of
administrative institution.14
13

Note also that mere exposure to the views of others, without discussion, has
a similar amplifying effect. See David Myers, Polarizing Effects of Social
Comparison, 14 J Experimental Soc. Psych. 554 (1978).
14
See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Stanford Law Review (forthcoming 2000). The
point is generally discussed in Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, supra note,
at 2126-2130.

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

6

This Article comes in six parts. Part II sets the stage, with brief
discussions of the problem of calculating punitive damage awards,
the legal background, the existing literature on unpredictable awards,
and the effects of deliberation. Part III, the heart of the Article,
discusses the methodology and results of the current study. Part IV
investigates group polarization and associated causal mechanisms,
involving social influences and persuasive arguments. Part V
discusses the implications of the study for punitive damage reform.
Part VI is the conclusion.
II. Theoretical Preliminaries: Outrage and Scales
Jury awards of punitive damages have become one of the most
controversial topics in modern public law.15 To take just one
example, an award of $4.9 billion against General Motors attracted a
great deal of national attention in July, 1999.16 It is now clear that
the due process clause imposes constraints on permissible awards.17 A
number of statutes, enacted and proposed, create punitive damage
“caps,”18 and high awards have become a primary impetus for tort
reform in general.19 There are also controversial issues about punitive
damage awards in civil rights cases, most notably sexual
harassment.20 At the same time, the problems created by punitive
awards bear on related questions in other areas of the law, involving,
15

See, e.g., Symposium, 1998 Wisconsin L. Rev. 1; A. Mitchell Polinsky and
Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev.
869 (1998); Marc Galanter and David Luban, Poetic Justice, 42 Am U L Rev
1393 (1993); David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages,
40 Ala. L. Rev. 705 (1989); William Landes and Richard A. Posner, The
Economic Structure of Tort Law 160-65, 184-85, 223-24 (1987)..
16
See The New York Times, July 31, 1999, Section A; Page 9; Column 3,
General Motors Appeals Record Lawsuit Damages.
17
See BMW v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
18
See generally Developments in the Law—The Civil Jury, 110 Harv L Rev
1408, 1533 n. 158 (1997) (discussing actual and proposed caps).
19
See, e.g., Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 5, 105th Cong. Section
108 (1997). For general discussion, skeptical of the attention paid to high
awards, see Marc Galanter, Shadow Play: The Fabled Menace of Punitive
Damages, 1998 Wisconsin L Rev 1.
20
See Judy Shih and Cass R., Sunstein, Damages in Sexual Harassment
Cases, in Sexual Harrassment (Catharine MacKinnon and Reva Siegel eds,
forthcoming 2000).
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for example, compensatory damages for pain and suffering, libel, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.21 Similar problems arise
whenever an administrative agency is asked to impose civil fines and
also in the area of criminal sentencing.22
Participants in the legal system are often requested to come up
with some kind of judgment, factual or normative, and then to
“translate” that judgment into a dollar award. In the area of punitive
damages, it is necessary to make some assessment of the character of
the defendant’s behavior, and then to ascertain the appropriate dollar
amount to be paid to the plaintiff by way of punishment. In many
domains, compensatory judgments raise similar puzzles. While juries
are nominally expected to find a “fact”—what amount of money
would restore the plaintiff to the status quo ante?—it is often
extremely difficult to monetize the relevant harm, and normative
judgments undoubtedly play a significant role.23 In the case of
punitive damages, it is extremely difficult for even experts to agree on
what dollar amount constitutes adequate “punishment” or produces
an appropriate deterrrent signal.
In all of these areas, the legal system is pervaded by a degree of
unpredictability and variance, resulting in apparent arbitrariness, as
similarly situated people are treated differently.24 An extensive study
of pain and suffering cases found that as much as 40% of the awards
consists of “noise,” unexplained by objective factors.25 A study of all
reported sexual harassment cases was unable to connect either
compensatory or punitive awards to any case characteristics that

21

See, e.g., Randall Bovgher et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort, 83 NW U
L Rev 908 (1989); David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury
Damages Assessments, 80 Iowa L Rev 1109 (1995); David Leebron, supra
note.
22
See Edward L. Rubin, Punitive Damages, 1998 Wisc. L. Rev. 131.
23
See generally Michelle Anderson and Robert MacCoun, Goal Conflict i n
Juror Assessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23 Law and
Human Behavior 313 (1999); Patrick Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (1997).
24
See, e.g., David Leebron, supra note; Jonathan Karpoff and John Lott, O n
the Determinants and Importance of Punitive Damages Awards, 42 J. L. &
Econ. 527 (1998).
25
See Leebron, supra note.
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might be thought to explain jury judgments.26 The punitive damage
area is more complicated—a point to which we will return
shortly—but there is evidence of significant variability here as well.27
The most ambitious claims to the contrary attempt to show that
once the compensatory award has been made, the punitive award
becomes predictable to a certain degree28; but the same data show
that at the time a case is filed, it is very hard to know the expected
punitive award, and that there is a generally a great deal of “noise” in
outcomes.29
To understand the current study, it is necessary to understand
its predecessor by the way of background. Our earlier study involved a
demographically diverse set of jury-eligible citizens from Austin,
Texas.30 The relevant experiment involved 28 personal injury cases,
which respondents were asked to assess in one of three ways:
outrageousness, on a bounded numerical scale (0 to 6); intent to
punish, on a bounded numerical scale (also 0 to 6); and actual
26

See Judy Shih ad Cass R. Sunstein, Damages in Sexual Harassment Cases,
forthcoming in Sexual Harassment (Catharine MacKinnon and Reva Seigel
eds. 1999)
27
See Karpoff and Lott, supra note. There is some dispute over the degree of
unpredictability. Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive
Damages, 26 J. Legal Stud. 623 (1997), shows that the log of punitive awards is
predicted reasonably well from a set of objective characteristics of cases i n
which awards were made; in particular, it is shown that the compensatory
award is a fairly good predictor of the punitive award. See id. at 644. In terms
of real dollars rather than log dollars, however, there is a degree of
unpredictability in the Eisenberg data as well, because the severe skewness of
the awards creates a possibility of either small or huge awards in identical cases.
See also Karpoff and Lott, supra.
Note also that predictability can be understood in different ways: (a)
predictability exists when case characteristics predict punitive awards; (b)
predictability exists when the judgments of one group of six or twelve predicts
the judgments of another group of six or twelve; (c) predictability exists when
an actor can assess expected liability when something goes wrong. Our
principal emphasis here is on (b); Eisenberg’s emphasis is on (a); both are
relevant to (c). Of course the three are closely related in practice.
28
See Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J
Legal Stud 623 (1997).
29
See Karpoff and Lott, supra note.
30
See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade, Assessing
Punitive Damages, 107 Yale LJ 2071 (1998).
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awards, on the unbounded scale of dollars. As noted, our principal
findings were twofold. People’s moral judgments are widely shared
and predictable, in fact strikingly so, at least in the personal injury
cases studied in the experiment.31 But in spite of this point, and in
the presence of shared moral judgments, people’s judgments on a
dollar scale—the scale, or “response mode,” favored by the legal
system—are highly unpredictable in the sense that the median
judgment of any group of twelve people is an extremely poor
predictor of the median judgment of any other group of twelve
people.32 Lacking a reliable understanding of how deliberation
would affect individual judgments, we used the median of groups of
twelve individuals, randomly selected from our pool of 899 and
combined into a large number of “synthetic juries.”33 At least in the
experimental setting, the primary identifiable source of the noise is
the difficulty jurors have in translating their punitive intent into
dollars. Dollar awards are highly variable despite the existence of
shared moral judgments.
To explain why the use of the dollar scale would produce
variability, we explored a link between the dollar scale and
psychological research on the problem of “magnitude scaling,” which
occurs when people are asked to assess stimuli—the brightness of
lights, the loudness of noise—along an unbounded numerical scale.34
This research shows a great deal of variability in assessments. The
underlying problem is that people are being asked to scale without a
“modulus,” that is, without a standard that would help give meaning
to various numbers on the scale.35 Consider the words of one of the
subjects in the relevant experiments: “I felt freer to use numbers over
a wide range. I liked the idea that I could just relax and contemplate
the tones. When there was a fixed standard I felt more constrained
31

Id. at 2097-2100.
See id. at 2100-2103.
33
We relied on evidence that median judgments are a good predictor. See James
Davis, Group Decision Making and Quantatitive Judgments: A Consensus
Model, in Understanding Group Behavior 35, 47 (Erich White and James
Davis eds., 1996); Shari Diamond and Jonathan Casper, Blindfolding the Jury,
26 L & Society Rev. 513, 553 (1992). We did note, however, the possibility of
effects of the sort observed in the study here. See SKS at 2101 at n. 128.
34
See S.S. Stevens, Psychophysics (1975).
35
SKS at 2106-2107.
32
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to try to multiply and divide loudnesses, which is hard to do; but
with no standard I could just place the tone where it seemed to
belong.”36
The key point is that when a modulus is supplied, the variability
greatly decreases. Juries asked to assess punitive damage awards are in
effect asked to scale without a modulus. Unpredictable judgments are
a natural result even when people do not disagree about the
significant issues37—even when, that is, there is a kind of “bedrock”
moral judgment in place. If this point is correct, it helps explain the
observed variability in dollar awards in many areas of the law. It also
helps explain the disparities that led to the enactment of the
Sentencing Guidelines38; before the guidelines, judges were being
asked, in effect, to scale without a modulus, since the relevant scale
(years) has a great deal in common with the dollar scale (i.e.,
bounded below at zero, but with great discretion at the high end).
Our earlier study did not, however, involve deliberating juries,
and a natural question is whether deliberating juries would produce
similar or quite different results. Perhaps deliberation would reduce
variability.39 In any case a test of deliberating juries would help to
36

See S.S, Stevens, Psychophysics 37 (1975).
For similar results, see Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil
Jury Awards, Law & Human Behav., Spring 1997, at 243.
38
See Sandra Shane-DuBow et al., US Department of Justice, Sentencing
Reform in the United States (1985).
39
In a series of papers, Michael Saks has argued that juries actually reduce
variance. Saks’ research began by comparing twelve person juries to six person
juries, see the overview in Michael Saks, The Smaller the Jury, the Greater the
Unpredictability, 79 Judicature 263 (1996)—a comparison on which our study
here does not bear. But the analysis has been extended to comparisons of juries
and judges, with the suggestion that juries are likely to produce less variability
by virtue of their numbers. See Michael Saks, Do We Really Know Anything
About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—and Why Not? 140
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1147 (1992); Justice Improved: The
Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass
Torts, with Peter D. Blanck, 44 Stanford Law Review 815 (1992); Reducing
Variability in Civil Jury Awards, with Lisa A. Hollinger, Roselle L. Wissler,
David L. Evans, and Allen J. Hart, 21 Law and Human Behavior 243 (1997).
This basic conclusion is briefly challenged in a footnote in Robert MacCoun,
Inside the black box: What empirical research tells us about decisionmaking by
civil juries, in Verdict: Assessing the civil jury system 137, 178 n. 26 (Robert
E. Litan ed. 1993): “The argument is based on statistical sampling theory, but
37
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confirm or deny the wisdom of the decision, for purposes of creating
synthetic juries, to treat the median judgment of a group of twelve as
the likely judgment of any deliberating group. An alternative
possibility, referred to in the introduction, was to assume that there
would be group polarization—that the process of collective
deliberation would move the group further in the direction of the
initial tendency suggested by the median of individual judgments.
Hence our main purpose in this study was to examine the effects of
jury deliberation on dollar awards and in particular to see whether
deliberation would increase or decrease predictability. In the process
we also hoped, as a secondary goal, to find out whether the original
findings—strikingly shared moral judgments but erratic
awards—would be replicated with a new sample of citizens from a
different state, and with new and richer case materials.
III. Deliberating Juries: An Experimental Inquiry
A. Method
Jury-eligible citizens from Phoenix, Arizona were recruited and
paid by a survey firm. Participants were randomly assigned to a sixperson jury, and to a response mode order; some juries judged dollar
awards first and punishment ratings second, and others completed
the tasks in the opposite order. Six juries (out of a total of 480) had
only five members because an insufficient number of participants
showed up at a given appointment time. A pilot test of 29 juries was
conducted in Phoenix to test the materials and procedure. Because
adjustments were very minor, these juries were added to the main
sample and the combined sample was analyzed together. Therefore,
a total of 3048 citizens participated in 509 juries.
the analogy between empaneled juries and random samples is an imperfect one.
Thus, it is a plausible hypothesis, but requires more rigorous testing than it
has received to date.” We have attempted a more rigorous test here, finding that
juries produce more variability as compared with the mean of individual
predeliberation judgments. This finding suggests, though it does not prove,
that juries will produce more variability in awards than judges (a suggestion
supported by the possibility that judicial experience with a wide range of cases
will introduce the equivalent of a “modulus” by which to discipline dollar
awards).
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The procedure consisted of four parts. In Part 1, all participants in a
given session viewed a videotape for the case they would consider,
read the corresponding written materials, and recorded their personal
judgment of the appropriate punitive damage award or punishment
rating (Table 1). In Part 2, participants were randomly assigned to a
jury of six members, and given 30 minutes to deliberate on and reach
a unanimous verdict on a punitive damage amount or a severity of
punishment rating.
Table 1
Response Mode Manipulation
Punishment
How much should the defendant be punished
because of their actions, and to deter the defendant and
others from similar actions in the future? Note that the
compensatory damages that the defendant must pay do
not count as part of the punishment. Please circle the
number that best expresses the jury’s judgment of the
appropriate level of punishment.
None
0

Mild
1

2

Extremely
Severe Severe

Substantial
3

4

5

6

7

8

$ Damages
What amount of punitive damages (if any) should
the defendant be required to pay as punishment and to
deter the defendant and others from similar actions in
the future? Note that the compensatory damages that
the defendant must pay do not count as part of the
punishment. Please write the amount of punitive
damages that the jury agreed on in the blank below.
$ _____________________
In Part 3, a new individual response form was distributed,
which asked them to record a second personal judgment for the

13

Are Juries Less Erratic than Individuals?

same case, using the complementary type of verdict (punishment
rating or dollar damages) from the one they had already used. In
Part 4, the jury again deliberated to reach a unanimous verdict on
this second type of judgment for the same case. Thus, for each
individual, and for each jury, we have both a dollar award and a
punishment rating for the case they considered.
The stimuli consisted of fifteen personal injury scenarios.40 An
example is provided in the Appendix. A videotape was prepared for
each case, in which a professional actor read the text of the case and
all instructions aloud. To maximize comprehension, participants
were required both to view the videotape and to read the written
version. Firm size (annual profits of $100-200 million) and
compensatory damages ($200,000) were held constant for all cases.
Thus, the variability we observe cannot be accounted for by a model
that depends on variability in compensatory damage awards.
B. Results
1. Basics
Despite the half hour time limit for deliberation, 91% of juries
reached a unanimous verdict on the punishment scale (a total of 461
verdicts) and 82% of juries reached a unanimous verdict on a dollar
amount (a total of 416 verdicts). The remainder had not reached a
verdict when the time limit expired; these were treated as hung. All
further analyses were conducted on the 401 juries that reached both a
punishment verdict and a dollar verdict.41 Because there were no
significant differences between response mode orders (i.e., dollarspunishment or punishment-dollars), we pooled verdicts made by
dollar-first juries and dollar-second juries in our analyses
(punishment verdicts were treated similarly).
40
Of these ten were more elaborate versions of the same scenarios used i n
Kahneman, Schkade and Sunstein. supra, and five were completely new
scenarios which, like the first 10, were based on real cases (Table 1). The main
substantive elaboration on the original scenarios was the addition of a
paragraph of closing arguments by attorneys for each side.
41
We chose the more conservative path of focusing on juries with complete
responses to ensure that comparisons between punishment and dollar verdicts,
and between individuals and juries, were based on the same set of respondents.
Recreating our Tables and Figures with all available responses produces the
same pattern of results, with some slight differences in exact numbers.
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Table 2
Summary of Personal Injury Scenarios
Case
Williams v. National Motors
Smith v. Public Entertainment
Douglas v. Coastal Industries
Sanders v. A&G Cosmetics
Stanley v. Gersten Productions
Glover v. General Assistance
Lawson v. TGI International
Newton v. Novel Clothing
West v. MedTech
Windsor v. Int. Computers
Reynolds v. Marine Sulphur
Crandall v. C&S Railroad
Dulworth v. Global Elevator
Hughes v. Jardel
Nelson v. Trojan Yachts

Description
Motorcycle driver injured when brakes fail
Circus patron shot in arm by drunk security
guard
Auto airbag opens unexpectedly, injuring
driver
Man suffers skin damage from using
baldness cure
Elderly woman suffers back injuries from
using exercise video
Child ingests large quantity of allergy
medicine, needs hospital stay
Employee suffers anemia due to benzene
exposure on the job
Small child playing with matches burned
when pajamas catch fire
Disabled man injured when wheelchair lift
malfunctions
Secretary chronically ill due to radiation
from computer monitor
Seaman injured when molten sulphur
container fails
Train hits car at crossing, injuring driver
Shopper injured in fall when escalator
suddenly stops
Store employee raped in mall parking lot
Man nearly drowns when defective boat
sinks

In the aggregate, jury punishment and dollar verdicts produced very
similar rankings of the cases: there is a rank correlation of .88
between the jury dollar and punishment verdicts in Table 3.42
42

The Spearman rank correlation is an index of agreement between rankings
that is analogous to first converting each column to ranks (from 1 to 15 in this
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Table 3
Aggregate Responses by Case and Condition
Individuals

Juries

Mean
Punishme
nt Rating

Median
$ Damage
Award

Mean
Punishme
nt Rating

Median
$ Damage
Award

Reynolds

5.52

1,500,000

5.83

10,000,000

Glover

5.15

1,000,000

5.28

4,000,000

Lawson

4.42

500,000

4.64

2,000,000

Williams

4.82

500,000

5.27

1,500,000

Smith

5.372

50,000

5.75

1,000,000

West

4.54

500,000

5.42

1,000,000

Nelson

4.86

500,000

5.22

1,000,000

Hughes

4.83

500,000

5.14

1,000,000

Crandall

4.05

200,000

4.18

500,000

Douglas

3.77

200,000

4.07

500,000

Sanders

2.71

75,000

2.48

100,000

Windsor

2.56

50,000

1.93

50,000

Stanley

1.48

0

1.38

0

Dulworth

1.36

0

1.13

0

Newton

1.10

0

0.77

0

Average of Top 5

5.06

750,000

5.36

3,700,000

Average of Middle 5

4.41

380,000

4.81

800,000

Average of Bottom 5

1.84

25,000

1.54

30,000

Overall Average

3.77

385,000

3.90

1,510,000

Case

case) and then computing the correlation between the two sets of ranks. It is
interpreted similarly to conventional correlations.
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2. High awards way up, low awards slightly down
A view of the overall results for individuals and juries in Table 3
appears to show a striking and simple picture: juries produce higher
dollar awards than the individuals who compose them. This pattern
is also reflected, to a lesser degree, in punishment ratings. Higher
jury awards are not confined to the middle of the award distribution,
and also show up clearly in the extreme low (10th percentile) and
high (90th percentile) ranges of the distribution as well (Table 4).
Table 4
Dollar Punitive Damage Distributions
by Case for Individuals and Juries (10/90)
Individuals
th

Juries
th

90 pctile

th

10 pctile

Median

90th pctile

Case

10 pctile

Median

Reynolds

150,000

1,500,000

15,000,000 1,000,000

10,000,000 50,000,000

Glover

50,000

1,000,000

10,000,000 1,000,000

4,000,000

50,000,000

Lawson

0

500,000

10,000,000

250,000

2,000,000

15,000,000

Williams

25,000

500,000

5,000,000

200,000

1,500,000

10,000,000

Smith

1,000

250,000

5,000,000

100,000

1,000,000

20,000,000

West

2,000

500,000

3,000,000

250,000

1,000,000

5,000,000

Nelson

25,000

500,000

5,000,000

200,000

1,000,000

20,000,000

Hughes

30,000

500,000

3,250,000

200,000

1,000,000

4,000,000

Crandall

0

200,000

2,000,000

50,000

500,000

2,000,000

Douglas

0

200,000

3,250,000

1

500,000

25,000,000

Sanders

0

75,000

1,000,000

0

100,000

1,000,000

Windsor

0

50,000

1,000,000

0

50,000

5,000,000

Dulworth

0

0

200,000

0

0

200,000

Newton

0

0

500,000

0

0

300,000

Stanley

0

0

200,000

0

0

250,000

Medians

0

250,000

3,250,000

100,000

1,000,000

5,000,000
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This dramatic upward shift is indeed an important part of the
picture, but it does not tell the whole story. A closer look at Table 3
reveals a systematic difference among cases in the degree to which
juries are harsher than individuals: the more egregious the case, the
greater is the margin by which jury awards exceed individual awards.
For the five cases with the lowest awards, individual and jury awards
are approximately equal, but for the middle five cases jury awards are
twice as large, and for the top five cases five times as large. Indeed,
on the punishment scale, deliberation actually causes cases the
bottom five cases (those below the midpoint of the scale) to drop,
and those at or above the midpoint to rise.
As we will see, this is a characteristic response pattern when
group polarization is present. Thus it appears that polarization occurs
in the underlying moral judgments, as indicated by the punishment
ratings, and that the effect of this shift is amplified when expressions
must be made on the unbounded dollar scale. The fact that dollar
awards for the least severe cases did not decline is probably a
consequence of the absolute minimum award of zero, below which
awards could not go, rather than of a lack of a shift in underlying
judgments.
A more direct measure of polarization can be computed by
comparing jury verdicts to the judgments of the specific jurors that
compose them, regardless of which case they considered. If group
polarization is indeed occurring, we would expect that juries whose
individuals initially judge a case to be more severe would more
frequently produce high jury verdicts, compared to the
predeliberation judgments of individuals. The reverse would be true
of juries whose individuals initially judged a case to be less severe.
Note that this contrast can happen for the same legal case,
depending on the individual judgments jurors bring to deliberation.
To summarize the pre-deliberation judgments of jurors, we use
three logical benchmarks as points of comparison: the median, the
maximum, and the minimum judgments of the individuals in a jury.
A clear pattern emerges on all three of these measures, as depicted in
Figure 1. As a jury’s individuals judge a defendant’s behavior to
deserve more severe punishment, the tendency of the jury to exceed
the median dollar award of its members rises rapidly, reaching 100%
at an average rating of 7 or more.

_Figure 1
Juror Judgments Compared to the $ Awards of Their Juries
Jury > Median Juror

Jury >= Maximum Juror

100%

Jury <= Minimum Juro r

100%

100%

90%

90%

90%

80%

80%

80%

70%

70%

70%

60%

60%

60%

50%

50%

50%

40%

40%

40%

30%

30%

30%

20%

20%

20%

10%

10%

10%

0%

0%
0-1

1-2

2-3

3-4

4-5

5-6

6-7

Average Juror Punishment Rating

7-8

0%
0-1

1-2

2-3

3-4

4-5

5-6

6-7

A verage Juror Punishment Rating
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The tendency toward extremely high verdicts shows a similar
pattern: the percentage of jury awards at or above the maximum
individual award rises steadily with the intended severity of
punishment, and indeed leaps to 100% when the average juror is at
or above 7 on the punishment scale. In contrast, the tendency
toward extremely low verdicts shows the opposite pattern: the
percentage of jury awards at or below the minimum individual award
declines with the intended severity of punishment, and leaps to
100% when the average juror is below 1 on the punishment scale.
As a result of the increased extremity produced by polarization,
juries produce more unpredictable judgments than individuals, in the
sense that the width of a confidence interval for a prospective award
is much greater.43 Jury awards also have a higher standard deviation
(σ = $14,118,179) than do the median awards of their jurors (σ =
$2,715,098). Contrary to the possibility that this increased variance
results from juries distinguishing more consistently between cases
than individuals, this relationship holds separately for each of the 15
cases. The problem is less severe but still present with jury
punishment ratings (σ = 2.37) compared to individuals (σ = 2.00).44
A important final question about the increased unpredictability
is the extent to which it results from additional random noise
introduced by the uncontrolled vagaries of group deliberation, or
instead from the systematically higher level of awards due to
polarization. Because dollars are a magnitude scale, which is bounded
at zero, a higher average award necessarily means a higher variance as
well. Indeed, a well understood characteristic of magnitude scales is a
high correlation between the mean and standard deviation of
responses. To investigate the source of the higher variance, we
borrow a classic analysis from psychophysics research, which (for
those who wish the skip the technical details) establishes that the
increased variance is indeed due primarily to a higher mean and
relatively little to random deliberation noise. If the shift in the level
of awards causes most of the increased variance, then the
43

For example, in Table 4 an 80% confidence interval for a jury award for the
Glover case would be $1,000,000 to $50,000,000 and an 80% confidence
interval for an individual award would be $50,000 to $10,000,000.
44
Thus the statistical juries analyzed in our previous study substantially
understated the unpredictability of jury awards.
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relationship between the mean and the standard deviation of awards
for different cases should be the same for juries and their individuals.
As is expected of a magnitude scale, the relationship is strong for
both individuals (R2 = .66) and juries (R2 = .79) and, remarkably,
both sets of points fall on essentially the same regression line.45 This
strongly suggests that the mechanism by which jury awards are less
predictable is a product not of irrational or erratic deliberations, but
rather of higher average awards, resulting from the more orderly and
predictable process of polarization.
3. Predictability
How predictable are our jury judgments? One sense in which
jury judgments can be considered predictable is if there is high
agreement between juries randomly selected from the population.
To examine this question, we reprise an analysis from our earlier
study, which simulated the convening of a separate jury for each case
on a given day. By comparing the verdicts of different sets of
randomly selected juries for our 15 cases we can assess the
predictability of awards.46 The correlations in Table 5 show that
there is strong agreement between sets of juries when judging
punishment (r = .69), but far less agreement when they judge dollar
awards (r = .24).47 This correlation provides a striking conclusion:
only 6% of the variance48 in dollar awards is due to differences
between cases, and the remaining 94% is random noise. In contrast,
45

The slopes of the two regression lines are not significantly different.
The basic unit of this analysis is a set of 15 jury judgments (one for each of
the 15 cases), where one of the jury judgments for a given case is randomly
selected. This procedure simulates the convening of independent juries to deal
with 15 separate cases on the same day. Using this procedure, we created 60 sets
of 15 jury judgments for each response mode. We then computed the Pearson
correlation between each pair of sets. This computation was performed both
within response (e.g., the correlation between the punishment ratings of
different sets of 15 juries) and across responses (e.g., the correlation between
the punishment rating of set of 15 juries and the dollar awards of another set).
The data shown in Table 5 are medians of the 1770 correlations obtained
within each response mode or of the 3600 correlations obtained between two
response modes.
47
Further, the correlation between different sets of 15 juries responding with
dollar awards is actually lower than the correlation between a set of juries
judging punishment and another judging dollars.
48
The percentage of variance explained is equal to the square of the correlation.
46
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almost 50% of jury punishment ratings is accounted for by
differences between cases which, while less than perfect, offers a
dramatic improvement over dollar awards.
Table 5
Correlations Between Judgments of Sets of Mock Juries
Punishment
Punishment

.69

Dollars

.33

Dollars
.24

All entries are average correlations between 60 vectors of 15 randomly selected
jury awards (one for each case).

Table 6
Distribution of Jury $ Awards for
a Given Jury Punishment Rating
Jury Dollar Awards
Jury
Punishment
Rating

10th
pctile

Median$

90th pctile

Mean $

Juries

8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

1,000,000
1,000,000
500,000
250,000
200,000
40,000
0
0
0

15,000,000
2,250,000
2,750,000
1,333,333
825,000
200,000
100,000
22,500
0

100,000,000
25,000,000
25,000,000
10,000,000
5,000,000
1,000,000
600,000
100,000
0

32,583,333
10,205,000
9,756,757
4,857,111
3,436,947
595,000
399,842
40,063
239

12
20
74
75
90
33
19
16
63

Another sense of predictability, one of great practical
importance, concerns the relationship between a jury’s underlying
moral judgment and its dollar award. If juries who agree perfectly on

Figure 2
The Greater the Intent to Punish,
the Greater the Range of Possible Awards

50,000,000

45,000,000

10th pctile
Med ian $
90th pctile

40,000,000

35,000,000

30,000,000

25,000,000

20,000,000

15,000,000

10,000,000

5,000,000

0

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Jury Punishment Rating

punitive intent disagree on a dollar award, the similarly situated are
plainly treated differently. To examine this form of unpredictability,
we analyze the distribution of dollar awards for juries who agreed on
exactly the same punishment rating (Table 6). It is clear from Table
22
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6 that even juries who agree precisely on punitive intent vary widely
in the dollar awards they judge to be appropriate. For example, at the
most common punishment rating of 4 (“Substantial” punishment),
awards range from $200,000 at the low end (the 10th percentile) to
$5,000,000 at the high end (the 90th percentile), and the maximum
award (not listed) is dramatically higher at $100,000,000. Note that
the range between the 10th and 90th percentiles for particular
punishment ratings in Table 6 are quite comparable to those for
individual cases in Table 4. As we found for those different cases, the
greater the intent to punish, the more extensive is the range of
possible awards, as depicted in Figure 2. The mapping of punitive
intent onto the magnitude scale of dollars is clearly implicated as the
source of this aspect of unpredictability, since the moral judgment, as
well as the compensatory damages and firm size, are all held
constant.
4. Do People From Arizona Agree With People From Texas? The
Effects of Geography, Race, Gender, Education, Age, and Wealth
A subsidiary but nonetheless important question is whether the
findings of the earlier study are replicated under the current study’s
changes in stimuli, procedure, and sample. The answer is that the
previous results are replicated in every essential respect. The findings
in the Texas study were replicated in Arizona, despite evident
differences between the two regions, and people from the two areas
evaluated cases in the same way. As before, dollars and ratings
produce very similar rankings of the cases (a rank correlation of .90
compared to .91 in the previous study). Different demographic
groups again produced very similar average evaluations, as indicated
by the extremely high correlations in Table 7. Punishment ratings
also decisively outperformed untransformed dollar awards in
distinguishing between cases (Table 8), in the sense that differences
between cases accounted for only 1% of the variance in individual
dollar awards (vs 34% for punishment ratings) and only 10% of jury
dollar awards (vs 53%).
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Table 7
Correlation Between Demographic Groups
on Intended Severity of Punishmenta
Men
Gender

Women

.99
White

Ethnicity

Household
Income

Age

a

Hispanic

Hispanic

.92

Other

.88

.81

< 30K

30-50K

30-50K

.98

> 50K

.99

.99

< 30

30-39

30-39

.97

40-49

.96

.97

> 50

.96

.97

40-49

.97

Entries are correlations between mean responses to scenarios by respondents
in the indicated demographic categories.
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Table 8
Proportion of Variance Explained by Cases:
Comparison to Kahneman, Schkade & Sunstein (1998)
KSS98*

Individuals

Juries

Punishment ratings

.40

.34

.53

Raw $ awards

.03

.01

.10

Log $ awards

.46

.31

.54

* KSS98 numbers are from the large firm/isolation condition, which is directly
comparable to the individual condition in the current study.

In addition, the ordering of case evaluations closely matches
that in our previous study. There are ten cases that are common to
both studies, and evaluations made by Texans in the previous study
are highly predictive of those made by Arizonans in the current
study—the rank correlation between the two samples is .90 for
punishment ratings and .98 for dollar awards. Finally, the absence of
an effect of response mode order suggest that prior deliberation
about a case, and even agreeing on a punishment rating, does little to
reduce unpredictability in dollar awards. Thus, the current larger
study, with several nontrivial changes, confirms the conclusion of
our previous study that individual moral judgments are predictable
and shared, but that expressing them in dollars produces
unpredictability and confusion, and especially so in juries.
IV. What Happened?
Deliberation and Group Polarization
Plainly many of the 509 deliberating juries were subject to
group polarization. Indeed, we believe that this is the first
experimental evidence of group polarization in punitive damage
awards.49 It is highly likely that the same pattern would be found
49

Group polarization has been shown with simulated juries in the context of
guilt and innocence. See David Myers and Martin Kaplan, Group-Induced
Polarization in Simulated Juries, 2 Personality and Soc. Psych. Bulletin 63
(1976).
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with compensatory awards involving hard-to-monetize injuries, such
as libel, civil rights violations, pain and suffering, and emotional
distress. In this section, we provide a general discussion of group
polarization, both to explain our results here and because the
phenomenon, which has received no sustained attention in the legal
literature, is of general interest.
A. The Basic Phenomenon
Group polarization is one of the most common patterns of
difference between individual decisions and deliberating groups,50
and it has been found in many diverse tasks. Polarization “is said to
occur when an initial tendency of individual group members toward
a given direction is enhanced [by] group discussion.”51 The result is

It might be tempting to suggest that the results are partly or largely a function
of the decision rule, in this case unanimity. Perhaps the requirement of
unanimity pushed people further in the direction of the dominant view,
without any group polarization, an idea that might be fortified with the
thought that those with outlier positions (in favor of extreme awards) would be
especially likely to hold out against a compromise view, thus producing
pressure toward the extremes. In the abstract it seems plausible to suggest that
the decision rule would matter, but as an explanation for our findings, it seems
less plausible in light of the fact that 20% of the jury judgments were as high as
or higher than that of the highest individual judgment pre-deliberation. Note
also that numerous studies show that group polarization occurs regardless of
the decision rule and hence it is extremely unlikely that the unanimity rule
accounted for other results here: “The shift effect is about equally robust
regardless of whether a group decision is required.” See David Myers and
Helmut Lamm, The Group Polarization Phenomenon, 83 Psych. Bulletin
602, 611 (1976). Of course we cannot exclude the possibility that the results
would be somewhat different without a unanimity rule; this is in fact a good
area for subsequent empirical study, especially in light of continuing questions
about the consequences of requirements of jury unanimity.
50
Some studies suggest that the median predeliberation judgment is a good
predictor of outcomes; but in some situations groups have indeed been observed
to make quite different decisions from those of the median or average of
individuals that compose them . See Norbert Kerr, Robert MacCoun, and
Geoffrey Kramer, Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103
Psychological Review 687 (1996); Daniel Gigone and Reid Hastie, Proper
Analysis Of The Accuracy Of Group Judgments. 121 Psychological
Bulletin149 (1997).
51
See Isenberg, supra note, at 1141.
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that groups often make more extreme decisions—both higher or
lower—than would the typical or average individual in the group.
Consider some examples. (a) A group of moderately profeminist
women will be more strongly profeminist after discussion.52 (b)
Citizens of France become more critical of the United States and its
intentions with respect to economic aid.53 (c) After discussion,
whites predisposed to show racial prejudice offer more negative
responses to the question whether white racism is responsible for
conditions faced by African-Americans in American cities.54 (d)
After discussion, whites predisposed not to show racial prejudice
offer more positive responses to the same question.55 It should
follow, for example, that a group moderately predisposed in favor of
affirmative action should strongly favor it after discussion; that those
moderately critical of an ongoing war effort would, after discussion,
sharply oppose the war; that a group moderately predisposed to hire a
certain job candidate will, after discussion, support the application
with considerable enthusiasm. The phenomenon has conspicuous
importance to the operation of deliberating bodies, including juries;
but it has been barely noticed in the legal culture. Obviously the
pattern described above is exactly what would be predicted if group
polarization were at work.56

52

See D.G. Myers, Discussion-Induced Attitude Polarization, 28 Human
Relations 699 (1975).
53
Brown at 224.
54
D.G. Myers and G.D. Bishop, The Enhancement of Dominant Attitudes
in Group Discuission, 20 J Personality and Soc. Psych. 286 (1976),
55
See id.
56
There is one difference: In the group polarization studies, the phenomenon
is usually defined by reference to scales having two sides, with a “neutral”
midpoint. This is the arrangement by which it makes sense to speak of initial
dispositions and their aggravation. Dollar awards, by contrast, have no
“neutral” midpoint. Our study suggests that what matters is the psychological
predisposition—to increase the tendency in which the group is leaning—rather
than the methodological definition. Hence the processes that produce
polarization occur even in the absence of a defined midpoint. We are grateful to
Robert MacCoun for help with this point.
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B. Risky Shifts, Cautious Shifts
Group polarization was first found in a series of experiments
involving risk-taking decisions.57 Before 1961, conventional wisdom
had been that as compared with the individuals who compose it, a
group of decision-makers—for example a committee or
board—would be likely to favor a compromise and thus to avoid
risks. But the relevant experiments found otherwise; they identified
what has become known as the “risky shift.”58 A group of
deliberating people was more likely to take risks than are the
individual members.
In these experiments, people were asked to assess the probability
that a new company, for which some person A is considering
employment, will prove “financially sound.” Group decisions showed
a repeated pattern toward greater risk-taking—that is, after
discussion, participants tended to assess the likelihood of financial
soundness as consistently higher than the median judgment of the
group predeliberation. But later studies showed that under certain
conditions, it was possible to induce a “cautious shift” as well. Where
the judgments of individual group members were relatively cautious,
deliberation would produce a strong tendency toward greater
caution. Thus ”a group discussion moves decisions to more extreme
points in the direction of the original inclination . . . , which means
shift to ether risk or caution in the direction of the original
disposition, and the size of the shift increases with the degree of the
initial polarization.”59 Similar results have been found in many
contexts, involving, for example, questions about economic aid,
architecture, political leaders, race, feminism, and judgments of guilt
or innocence.60 The parallel here is of course the increase in large
awards (for juries whose members were individually disposed in this
direction) and the decrease in small awards (for juries whose
members were originally so disposed).
57

We draw in this and the following paragraph on Brown, supra note, at 200206.
58
See J.A.F. Stoner, A Comparison of Individual an d Group Decisions
Including Risk, unpublished master’s thesis, School of Management,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.A.F. Stoner, Risky and Cautious
Shifts in Group Decisions, 4 J Experimental Social Psych. 442 (1968).
59
Brown, supra, at 211.
60
See id.
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C. Two Mechanisms
There have been two main explanations for group polarization,
both of which have been extensively investigated.61 Massive support
has been found on behalf of both explanations.62
The first involves social comparison.63 On this view, people
want to be perceived favorably by other group members (and also to
perceive themselves favorably), and once they hear what others
believe, they adjust their positions in the direction of the dominant
position. They may want to signal, for example, that they are not
cowardly or cautious, and hence they will frame their position so
that they do not appear such by comparison to other group
members.64 The result is to press the group’s position toward one or
another extreme.
The dynamic behind the social comparison explanation is that
most people may want to take a position of a certain socially
preferred sort—in the case of risk-taking, for example, they may
want to be perceived (and to perceive themselves) as moderate risktakers, and their choice of position may be partly a product of this

61

Isenberg, supra, and Brown, supra, review this literature. We draw largely
on work done in the 1970s, because that was the period in which group
polarization was studied most extensively, and because the principal findings,
for our purposes, have not been challenged in the subsequent literature (with
several exceptions to be noted below).
62
Note that conformity does not explain group polarization. People are not
attempting to conform, even under the social comparison theory; they are
attempting to maintain their relative position, and the revelation of the views of
others shifts people’s conception of what judgment is necessary to maintain that
position. See Myers, supra note, at 562, indicating that people “want to
perceive themselves as somewhat different from others” and that “people want
to differentiate themselves from others, to a small extent and in the right
direction.”
63
There is an obvious connection between this point and recent work i n
economics on reputational influences on behavior. See Timur Kuran, Private
Truths, Public Lies (1996). Note, however, that the social comparison approach
emphasizes presentation of self to self, as well as self to others. “By ‘oneupping’ the self-presentations of others, people can see and peresent themselves
as basically similar, yet desirably distinctive.” Myers, supra, at 562.
64
On signalling generally, see Eric Posner, Symbols, Signals, and the Law
(forthcoming 2000).
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desire.65 No one can know what such a position would be until the
positions of others are revealed.66 Thus individuals move their
judgments in order to preserve their image to others and their image
to themselves. A key claim here is that information alone about the
actual positions of others—without discussion—will produce a shift,
and evidence has confirmed this fact. Research shows that this effect
helps explain a shift toward caution (the “cautious shift”) as well.67
The second explanation emphasizes the role of persuasive
arguments.68 The key point here is that an individual’s choice or
position on an issue is a function of the number and persuasiveness
of arguments presented. The choice therefore moves in the direction
of the position held by the most confident and outspoken members
of the group. Because a group that is inclined in a certain direction
will have a disproportionate number of arguments supporting that
direction, the result of discussion will be to move individuals further
in the direction of their initial inclinations.
The persuasive arguments theory begins with the intuition that
if a group is deliberating about some difficult question with a factual
answer (how many countries are there in Africa, for example),
discussion will produce some movement, not toward the mean, but
toward the minority view on which one or a few members have
65

For a quite vivid demonstration of such a process in the enactment of the
Clean Air Act, one that does not, however, identify the mechanisms, discussed
here, see Bruce Ackerman, John Millian, and Donald Elliott, Toward a
Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.
L. Econ. & Organization 313 (1985).
66
“Once the real locations of the mean was known, should it not be the case,
granting that everyone wanted to see himself as reasonably audacious, that
those who were really below the mean would be motivated to adopt riskier
positions and so change the mean and produce the risky shift?” Brown, supra,
at 214.
67
Investigations of social influence have emphasized both one-upmanship and
the removal of pluralistic ignorance, that is, ignorance of what other people
think (or are willing to say they think). Note that it is implicit in these
findings that people seem to want not to conform, but to be different from
others in a desirable way. “To be virtuous . . . is to be different from the mean
– in the right direction and to the right degree.” Brown, supra note, at 469.
68
There is an obvious connection between this theory and recent work i n
economics on informational influences on behavior and in particular on
information cascades. See David Hirchleifer, The Blind Leading The Blind, i n
The New Economics of Human Behavior (1997).
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accurate information. Of course many of the questions involving
group polarization do not have purely factual answers. But a key
aspect of those discussions is that the person with the correct answer
is likely to state his view with a high degree of confidence, and also
be able to make some argument in favor of that view. Novel
arguments, bringing up fresh points, are especially likely to be
persuasive. Thus it is suggested that the “important thing that
happens in discussion is that individual arguments are expressed and
become fully shared.”69
When people hear arguments that they perceive as valid, or find
to be new, they will shift in the direction suggested by those
arguments. Discussion produces larger “argument pools.” If a group
of moderately feminist women become more feminist, a group
moderately opposed to gun control more extremely so, and so forth,
the reason is that the “argument pool” of any such group will
contain a preponderance of arguments in the direction suggested.
Once the set of individual arguments is exposed to all individual
members, there will be an inclination in the direction of initial
inclinations, but more extremely and intensely so. ”Because the
choice dilemmas have total argument pools in which the balance
favors either risk or caution, the larger sample of the pool made
available to all in discussion will produce either a risky shift or a
cautius shift according to the direction of prediscussion inclinations
as revealed in the means of initial decisions.”70 The suggestion is that
group polarization will occur when convincing arguments produce a
shift in the direction of prediscussion inclinations, revealed in the
means of the initial decisions. At the same time, the persuasive
arguments theory suggests that there will be “depolarization” if and
when new persuasive arguments are offered that are opposite to the
direction initially favored by group members, and there is evidence
for this phenomenon as well. 71
69

Brown, supra, at 219.
Brown, supra, at 219.
71
A third possibility is that hearing other similar opinions produces greater
confidence in individual positions, opening members to a more extreme
judgment in the same direction. raised recently by Heath and Gonzales . See
Chip Heath and Richard Gonzales, Interaction With Others Increases
Decision Confidence But Not Decision Quality: Evidence Against Information
70
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Of course it is not the case that all groups polarize. There are
two qualifications to the claims made thus far. First, these are
statistical regularities, and some groups will not polarize at all, a
statement confirmed by many individual juries in our study. Second,
depolarization, rather than polarization, will be found when the
relevant group consists of individuals drawn equally from two
extremes.72 Thus if people who initially favor caution are put
together with people who initially favor risk-taking, the group
judgment will move toward the middle. It is remarkable, then, that
despite the presence of some groups who did the opposite, the
groups in our study who did polarize were numerous enough to cause
the aggregate pattern of our results to mimic polarization.
V. Implications and Reforms
A. Is There A Problem? What Kind of Problem?
The group polarization phenomenon (and other evidence
involving group performance) raises questions about the common
belief that groups, and in particular juries, generally make better
decisions than individuals. The common belief does seem sensible if
only because the averaging of multiple judgments should reduce
errors and variance—even if group deliberation has no effect on
individual judgments.73 But a now considerable literature, using a
wide variety of tasks, concludes that deliberating groups hold no
generalized advantage over individuals in the performance of
judgment tasks.74
More specifically, a review of judgmental biases in legal contexts
suggests that jury deliberations are actually slightly more likely to
amplify the biases of individuals than to attenuate them.75 Indeed, a
series of studies involving juries suggests that in a variety of contexts,
Collection Views Of Interactive Decision Making, 61 Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 305-326 (1997).
72
See H. Burnstein, Persuasion As Argument Processing, in Group Decision
Making (H. Brandstetter, J.H. Davis, and G. Stocker-Kreichgauer eds., 1982).
73
See the discussion of Saks, supra note.
74
Norbert Kerr, Robert MacCoun, and Geoffrey Kramer, Bias in Judgment:
Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 Psychological Review 687-719
(1996).
75
Id.
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jury judgments are likely to be more erratic than the judgments of
(the mean or median of a group of the same number of)
individuals.76 The simplest conclusion from our study here is that to
the extent that there is a concern about unpredictable damage
awards, deliberation is not likely to alleviate that concern. On the
contrary, deliberations increase unpredictability in the particular
sense that the dollar judgment of one group of six (or twelve) is
highly unlikely to predict the dollar judgment of another group of six
(or twelve)—in fact it is less likely to predict that judgment that it
would if the group judgment were based on the median judgment of
the individual members.77
Unpredictability is a serious problem for jury judgments, partly
because it ensures that the similarly situated will not be treated
similarly (and thus produces unfairness for plaintiffs and defendants
alike), partly because it may produce overdeterrence in risk-averse
defendants, partly because of the sheer cost involved in litigationrelated expenses. But unpredictable awards might be worthwhile if
many or most of them are sound; predictable awards are nothing to
76

In the jury damage assessment context, Diamond and Casper’s (1992) mock
jury awards were significantly higher than the mean individual award (by
26%). See Shari Diamond and Jonathan Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to
Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 Law and
Society Review 513-563 (1992). This finding is mirrored qualitatively in other
studies, see James H. Davis, Group Decision Making and Quantitative
Judgments: A Consensus Model, in Understanding Group Behavior:
Consensual Action by Small Groups (E. Witte and J. Davis eds. 1996);
Martin Kaplan and Charles Miller, Group Decision Making and Normative
Versus Informational Influence: Effects of Type of Issue and Assigned
Decision Rule, 53 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 306 (1987) (for
compensatory but not punitive damages). If this general trend applies to our
previous study, see Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schakde, supra, at 2100-2104,
then the synthetic, statistical “juries” analyzed there will have underestimated
both the mean and the variance of the awards that deliberating juries would
have made. Consistent with this conjecture, Gigone and Hastie, supra, found
that group judgments have higher error variances than the average judgment of
group members.
77
Note also that because our study stipulated compensatory damages, and held
them fixed across cases, we may well have understated true variance in punitive
awards, because according to previous research, see Eisenberg, supra note;
Karpoff and Lott, supra note, real juries anchor on their own compensatory
award, rather than into some constant value
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celebrate if they are invariably too low or too high. Indeed, it is
possible that the deterrent signal created by a range of variable
awards, including a number of very high awards, is better, from the
standpoint of preventing undesirable conduct, than the comparable
signal of any realistic alternative.78 There is thus an important
remaining question: whether jury deliberation, including group
polarization, produces a better deterrent signal or more accurate
judgments than alternative arrangements.
It is certainly possible that the median judgment of a set of (say)
100 deliberating juries is more accurate than the median judgments
of (say) 600 individuals. Without an independent account of good
outcomes, in this contested area of the law, this possibility is very
hard to assess.79 But an understanding of the mechanisms that
underlie group polarization certainly does not give much reason for
optimism, at least in the context of damage awards. To the extent
that polarization occurs as a result of social comparison, there is no
reason to think that the higher and lower post-deliberative awards
are better (or for that matter worse) than the lower and higher
median of pre-deliberative individual judgments. When social
comparison helps generate both larger and smaller awards, no
relevant information is producing improved judgments.80 The
increased unpredictability caused by polarization, however, is still
present and problematic, even if the means are no more or less valid.
To the extent that polarization occurs as a result of persuasive
arguments, there might appear to be more reason to believe that
group discussion produces better, more informed outcomes. Recall
that with respect to purely factual questions on which one or a few
78

Cf. Galanter and Luban, supra note.
Compare the interesting claim that there is a “leniency shift” in criminal
juries and that this shift produces more accurate judgments, because juries are
more likely than individual jurors to apply the reasonable doubt standard
correctly. See Robert MacCoun and Norbert Kerr, Asymmetric Influence i n
Mock Jury Deliberation: Jurors’ Bias for Leniency, 54 J Persononality and
Social Psych. 21 (1988). There is no obvious analogy here, because it is not
easy to find a legal standard against which to evaluate the increase in large
awards and the decrease in small awards.
80
To be sure, discussion does dissipate pluralistic ignorance, by showing
people what others think; but this is hardly a guarantor of better outcomes,
whatever may be our criteria for defining them.
79
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group members have expertise, people are pushed toward a (correct)
minority view simply because one or a few members of the group
actually know the right answer.81 But it is not at all clear that there
is an analogy in the context of punitive damage awards. In this
setting, arguments that turn out to be persuasive may or may not be
sound. This is especially so in light of the pervasive problem of
“scaling without a modulus.” Even those with convincing arguments
are likely not to have a good reason to favor one or another dollar
figure (which is not to say that their numbers are worse than those
of anyone else), We conclude that the fact that high awards become
higher, and low awards become lower, should not be seen as a
tribute to the power of deliberation to lead people in better
directions—though aside from exacerbating the problem of
unpredictability, it may not lead them in worse directions either.
B. Reform Proposals
With respect to punitive damage awards, and damages awards
in related areas, many proposals have been motivated by a desire to
decrease unpredictability. This goal has, for example, played a role in
proposals for damage caps, for simple multipliers (relating punitive
awards to compensatory awards), and for informing the jury of
average awards or of intervals.82 It has played a role in constitutional
limitations as well.83 The desire to reduce unpredictability motivation
our discussion of the possibility of eliciting from the jury not dollar
awards, but normative judgments on a bounded numerical scale.84
These judgments might be converted into a dollar award through
some kind of calibration function, based on experts (“technocratic
populism”) or on population-wide data relating normative judgments
to dollar awards (“predictable populism”).85 Of course it is possible to
question whether it is practical to ask a deliberating jury to make a
moral judgment on a bounded numerical scale, hardly an ordinary
practice in daily life, and indeed a task that might seem even odder

81
82
83
84
85

Compare the finding of a “leniency shift” in MacCoun and Kerr, supra note.
See Saks et al., supra (discussing alternative approaches and their effects).
See BMW v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1601 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring).
See Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade at 2112-2121.
See id.
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than the somewhat more familiar one of punishing wrongdoers
through dollar awards.
The findings here do not lead directly to any particular reform
proposal86; but they add two points to the existing literature. First,
they demonstrate that juries can use a bounded punishment scale
reliably. Juries are able to answer the normative question directly, and
they are also able to use a bounded numerical scale far more reliably
than the familiar dollar scale. And if deliberating juries are thought
to have advantages over other, less populist institutions—as many
people clearly believe87—then there is reason to consider a reform
proposal that would involve directly eliciting the jury’s moral
judgment. As noted, these judgments might be converted into a
dollar award by some kind of calibration formula, defined by expert
judgments about what different dollar awards would mean or do to
particular defendants, or instead on population-wide data relating
normative judgments to dollar awards. Either route would greatly
diminish unpredictability.88 The data here, along with previous data,
show that a calibration formula is also feasible to develop and use.89
The second point stems from the finding that deliberating
juries do not reduce erratic awards, and indeed that the process of
deliberation is one of the causes of unpredictability. We have seen
that deliberation can even produce “runaway juries,” if these are
understood as juries in which group discussion yields awards much
higher than those of even the highest of pre-discussion judgments.
Such juries can be produced even in a mock jury task. Thus our
findings fortify the suggestion that difficulties with the dollar scale
make it hazardous to continue to rely on the current system, in
which juries must map their moral judgments onto that scale
without being given any guidance about the meaning of the various
“points” on the scale.
86

They do suggest, somewhat amusingly, a simple way to promote
predictability: Do not allow jurors to deliberate, and simply take the mean of
their individual damage judgments! We do not discuss this alternative,
however, because it is so foreign to our traditions, and also because a great deal
of unpredictability would remain, as suggested by our data here, see Table 4,
and see also SKS at 2100-2104.
87
See Galanter and Luban, supra note.
88
See Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, at 2113-2120.
89
Id. at 2112-2118.
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To be sure, eliciting moral judgments rather than dollar awards
would not answer all of the relevant questions, because group
polarization also produces not only higher and lower dollar awards,
but also higher and lower moral judgments. There is no reason,
however, to think that the resulting “verdicts” are worse than the
mean of individual judgments before discussion, just as there is no
reason to think that they are better (except that increased
unpredictability is unambiguously worse in itself). In the absence of
an independent criterion of rightness, it probably makes sense to
continue the tradition of obtaining the deliberative judgment,
without at the same time creating the forms of unpredictability and
unfairness that can come from the unbounded dollar scale.
The most radical reform would be to dispense with the jury
entirely and to move toward judicial judgments or even to develop a
kind of penalty schedule, based on the judgments of some
combination of representative and expert institutions.90 We cannot
evaluate these alternatives here. But to the extent that our study
shows both decreasing and increasing awards as a result of group
polarization, operating independently of better-informed or sounder
judgments of any kind, it supplies additional support for that more
radical reform. Of course the radical reform might be rejected if the
relevant institutions would be unreliable, perhaps because
bureaucracies might be vulnerable to the exercise of politically
powerful private groups. The question is one of comparative
institutional competence. What we have added here is that the
process of deliberation will increase high awards and diminish low
awards, a result that cannot be comforting in light of the increased
unpredictability and the pervasive problem of scaling without a
modulus.
90

The idea has received considerable attention in the analogous area of
contingent valuation. See Murray Rutherford et al., Assessing Environmental
Losses: Judgments of Importance and Damage Schedules, 22 Harv. Envtl. L.
Rev. 51 (1998); Richard B. Stewart, Liability for Natural Resource Injury, i n
Analyzing Superfund 219, 241-44 (Richard L. Revesz and Richard B. Stewart
eds. 1995). In the area of compensatory damages, see the plea for damages
schedules in Bovbjerg et al., supra. In the punitive damage context, see Viscusi,
supra note; Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, supra, at 2121-2126. For
damages generally, see Atiyah, supra note.
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VI. Conclusion
We have found that as compared with the median of individual
judgments, deliberation substantially increases group polarization:
Small awards become smaller, and large awards become
(significantly) larger. The point has implications for damage awards
in general and also for understanding social deliberation. From the
normative point of view, it is hard to know whether the resulting
judgments are better than the median of pre-deliberative individual
judgments. But four points seem clear. First, moral judgments about
personal injury cases are very widely shared over diverse communities
and demographic categories. Second, those shared moral judgments
do not produce predictable dollar awards. Third, group polarization
occurs, in a quite dramatic fashion, in the context of damage awards.
Hence both social influence and persuasive arguments drive group
judgments to more extreme points in the direction of the inclination
originally indicated by the median of pre-deliberation judgments.
Fourth, the problem of unpredictable and erratic judgments is likely
to be aggravated, rather than alleviated, by virtue of the fact that
juries are deliberative bodies.
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Appendix
Glover v. General Assistance

Joan Glover, a five-year-old child, ingested a large number of a
non-prescription allergy medicine called Allerfree, and required a
three-week hospital stay. The Allerfree bottle used a faulty
childproof safety cap. The Glovers sued the manufacturer of
Allerfree, the General Assistance company. The trial jury ordered
General Assistance to pay the Glovers $200,000 in compensatory
damages.
Facts of the Case Established at Trial
Joan’s parents testified that after her birth they had
“childproofed” their house and ensured that all of their medications
had childproof safety caps. The Allerfree bottle carries a label reading
“Childproof Cap.” Joan found the pills in a kitchen drawer and
ingested most of the bottle. The overdose permanently weakened
her respiratory system, which will make her more susceptible to
breathing-related diseases such as asthma and emphysema for the
rest of her life.
General Assistance is a large company (with profits of $100-200
million per year) that manufactures a variety of non-prescription
medicines. The company has sold tens of thousands of bottles of
medicines with childproof safety caps that were generally effective,
but had a failure rate much higher than any others in the industry.
Internal company documents showed that General Assistance had
chosen to ignore federal regulations requiring more effective safety
caps. An internal memo presented at trial says that “this stupid,
unnecessary federal regulation is a waste of our money”; it
acknowledges the risk that Allerfree might be punished for violating
the regulation but says “the punishments are extremely mild; basically
we’d be asked to improve the safety caps in the future.” An official at
the Food and Drug Administration had previously warned a General
Assistance executive that the company was “on shaky ground on this
one.”
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Closing Argument by Glovers’ Attorney
The attorney for the Glovers argued that General Assistance’s
disregard for children’s safety and for the law was abhorrent and
represented exactly the kind of reckless corporate greed deserving of a
high award of punitive damages. He concluded that General
Assistance’s shocking profit-mongering should be punished so that
the company would not feel itself at liberty to put children at risk in
the future.
Closing Argument by General Assistance’s Attorney
The attorney for General Assistance emphasized that while the
cap had a high failure rate relative to others on the market, it had
nonetheless been conceded at trial that the cap was effective in most
cases. She argued that, given that the FDA official had only
communicated to them verbally, and had not required the company
to take any action, it was not at all clear that the cap was actually in
violation of the regulation at all.
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